Photobucket Enjoy Every Sandwich



Thursday, December 28, 2006


THOUGHTS ON THE SECRET FORD TAPES

I'm apparently much smarter than even I thought. In my eulogy for President Ford Wednesday morning, I wrote the following, "He wouldn't have invaded countries without first having realistic goals as to how to administer them and extricate American forces."

When I wrote that, I was assuming that Ford didn't support what was happening in Iraq or how the situation got to be that way. I learned last night that not only was Ford critical, he said as much over two years ago to The Washington Post's Bob Woodward.

Former president Gerald R. Ford said in an embargoed interview in July 2004 that the Iraq war was not justified. "I don't think I would have gone to war," he said a little more than a year after President Bush launched the invasion advocated and carried out by prominent veterans of Ford's own administration.

In a four-hour conversation at his house in Beaver Creek, Colo., Ford "very strongly" disagreed with the current president's justifications for invading Iraq and said he would have pushed alternatives, such as sanctions, much more vigorously. In the tape-recorded interview, Ford was critical not only of Bush but also of Vice President Cheney -- Ford's White House chief of staff -- and then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who served as Ford's chief of staff and then his Pentagon chief.

"Rumsfeld and Cheney and the president made a big mistake in justifying going into the war in Iraq. They put the emphasis on weapons of mass destruction," Ford said. "And now, I've never publicly said I thought they made a mistake, but I felt very strongly it was an error in how they should justify what they were going to do."



Unlike President Ford, I did think going to war with Saddam Hussein was necessary. In fact, I still do. But I never predicated the case for war on WMD. Yes, everyone thought that there was an active weapons program in Iraq, but that's not the sort of thing that you go to war over unless you are absolutely certain. It also opens you up to the argument from your political opponents - both foreign and domestic - that there is selective enforcement inherent in the policy. The North Korean and Iranian programs weren't a secret in 2002-03, the Bush administration didn’t talk much about them.


I believed that war was necessary because of Saddam’s proven capacity for strategic miscalculation. It’s as though Saddam couldn't get out of bed in the morning without initiating a military conflict that would quickly spiral out of control as evidenced by his aggression against both Iran and Kuwait.


Describing his own preferred policy toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Ford said he would not have gone to war, based on the publicly available information at the time, and would have worked harder to find an alternative. "I don't think, if I had been president, on the basis of the facts as I saw them publicly," he said, "I don't think I would have ordered the Iraq war. I would have maximized our effort through sanctions, through restrictions, whatever, to find another answer."

On this point, I believe that President Ford is mistaken. Saddam was growing more dangerous precisely because the sanctions regime was falling apart. Just as the French, Russians and Germans refused to support the war, they were also leading the charge to rescind the sanctions that kept Iraq boxed in. If his past behaviour is any indication, Saddam would have been emboldened by this, gone on an arms shopping spree, and done something monumentally stupid. Saddam was bound and determined to confront America, and doing so while he was weak was far better than ding so after he had an opportunity to rearm. The debate shouldn't have been over if there would be a war with Iraq, but when and under what circumstances. But I believe it is a mistake to think of the war as anything other than inevitable as long as Saddam was in power.

That said, I agree with the former president that the administration's emphasis on Iraqi "freedom" was a disastrously naive notion and a major strategic miscalculation.
"Well, I can understand the theory of wanting to free people," Ford said, referring to Bush's assertion that the United States has a "duty to free people." But the former president said he was skeptical "whether you can detach that from the obligation number one, of what's in our national interest." He added: "And I just don't think we should go hellfire damnation around the globe freeing people, unless it is directly related to our own national security."

I thought at the time - and it seems abundantly clear now - that you cannot have freedom in an artificially created nation populated with people who have centuries of grievances against one another. You can have anarchy and civil war, to be sure, but not anything approaching democracy. At the very least, holding elections in the absence of total security was a recipe for disaster.

Given that modern Iraq was created by wrong-headed Wilsonianism , it seemed to me that more Wilsonian thinking was hardly a plausible solution to the country's problems. And those were problems that were almost certain to get worse after Saddam had been toppled. After all, the destruction of Yugoslavia and the horrors of Bosnia didn't occur until after the yoke of communism had been lifted. Purple fingers aside, it couldn't be clearer that democracy, at least in the short term, has been a disaster in Iraq.

There aren't any good options in Iraq and there never were. The country was held together by an authoritarian despot and once that despot was removed, the country crumbled. What President Bush didn't seem to understand - and still doesn't - is that a unified Iraq and democracy are mutually exclusive endeavours. One necessarily negates the other.

Since the international community generally and Iraq's neighbours specifically would never have tolerated a partition of Iraq, that left the installation of an authoritarian regime. It was never the Baath Party or the Iraqi military that posed such a threat; it was the penchant for strategic miscalculation by Saddam Hussein and his sons. Either was capable of governing Iraq after Saddam and either would have kept the chaos that ensued after the war.

Is that ideal? Certainly not, but neither is it entirely unique. More often than not, when the United States has intervened in foreign countries, they have left behind either an authoritarian civilian government or a military junta to govern. Prior to 2003, democracy was not the strategic objective of American foreign policy, international stability was. The Korean and Vietnam wars were not about freedom, they were about containing communism, and truly despotic regimes were tolerated in both countries to meet that end. Even today, the United States partners with some less than ideal partners in the War on Terror.

It is now clear that President Ford understood these things.

Ed Morrissey at Captains Quarters wrote about the Ford interviews this morning and suggested that the former president should have spoken out publicly, and that not doing so was almost cowardly.

I admire Mr. Morrissey greatly and read him daily, but I disagree with him completely on this point. It may well be that President Ford made President Bush aware of his concerns privately. Although there's no indication that the incumbent seeks out the opinions of his predecessors, we'll never know for certain.

But if Ford were to publicly criticize a sitting president's war policies, he would have done what so many conservatives justifiably scold Jimmy Carter for. As a former president, no one knew better than Gerald Ford that a president is elected to govern and for former presidents to object in public to the incumbent's foreign policies accomplishes nothing productive.

Some have raised questions about Ford's views being embargoed until after his death. This is not an unusual practice at all. Indeed, Harry Truman wrote entire books that were not published until fifteen years after his death (Where The Buck Stops. Another book of secret interviews that was almost poisonous in its tone toward Eisenhower, Merle Miller's Plain Speaking was released shortly after Truman's death,) and those were harshly critical of his successors.

What is unusual is that the tapes were released within 24 hours of Ford's death. But that is a decision that Bob Woodward and The Washington Post made, not President Ford. I suspect that he would never have agreed to have those quotes made public at this time. It is important to remember that the interviews took place in the context of a "future book" that Woodward planned on writing. That being the case, it is reasonable to conclude that Ford believed that those quotes would not be disclosed for several years, when either Iraq stabilized or American forces had withdrawn. I don't think any reasonable person believes that Gerald Ford would sabotage George Bush's war from beyond the grave, particularly when Mr. Bush has done more than enough to sabotage it from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

If anyone should be damned for putting the quotes out there now, it is Bob Woodward, not Gerald Ford. But that is difficult to do, given the close relationship that the president and his senior staff had with Woodward during the writing of his first two books on the Bush administration.

Ford's characterizations of Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Henry Kissinger are entertaining, but not particularly newsworthy. Of some historical interest is the fact that Rumsfeld knew nothing about the "Halloween massacre," where Kissinger was removed as National Security Advisor, and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was fired and replaced with Rumsfeld. It was wiely assumed that the move was engineered by chief of staff Rumsfeld and his deputy, Cheney. The shake-up was believed to be a masterstroke of political manoeuvring by Rumsfeld. Instead, he resented it deeply.

That same year, Ford also decided to fire Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger and replace him with Rumsfeld, who was then Ford's White House chief of staff. Ford recalled that he then used that decision to go to Kissinger and say, "I'm making a change at the secretary of defense, and I expect you to be a team player and work with me on this" by giving up the post of security adviser.


Kissinger was not happy. "Mr. President, the press will misunderstand this," Ford recalled Kissinger telling him. "They'll write that I'm being demoted by taking away half of my job." But Ford made the changes, elevating the deputy national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, to take Kissinger's White House post.

Throughout this maneuvering, Ford said, he kept his White House chief of staff in the dark. "I didn't consult with Rumsfeld. And knowing Don, he probably resented the fact that I didn't get his advice, which I didn't," Ford said. "I made the decision on my own."


The portrait painted of Kissinger is hardly new. Tales of his constant resignation threats have been detailed in literally dozens of books. It wasn't widely known that they continued after the fall of 1973, when his main competitors for influence with the president, H.R Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and Secretary of State William Rogers left the Nixon administration, but they are hardly surprising. By then Watergate had almost totally consumed Nixon's presidency and Kissinger was the last asset the president had. It should surprise no one that Kissinger would resume his prior behaviour when his influence was diminished in the new administration.

Indeed, one could argue that Kissinger's tantrums were the causus beli of what became Watergate. Accounts of the secret Cambodian bombing campaign had appeared in the press after the Nixon administration had denied it publicly. Consequently, Kissinger and Nixon had J. Edgar Hoover wiretap the home telephones of four journalists and eleven members of Kissinger's National Security Council staff in an effort to determine who the leaker was. Those wiretaps were revealed in the summer of 1974, and caused Kissinger to threaten to resign during a press conference in Austria.

The "Plumber's Unit" that was discovered in the Watergate Hotel was actually the direct result of another Kissinger tirade. When Daniel Ellsberg released the Pentagon Papers (a classified study of the Vietnam War's escalation ordered by President Johnson's Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara) to The New York Times and The Washington Post, Nixon was originally pleased. This was because the study was conducted before he took office and therefore embarrassed the Johnson and Kennedy administrations.

Kissinger on the other hand was furious. He told Nixon that the leak could destroy the then-secret "China opening." Nixon's views on the release of the papers changed very quickly. Since the FBI had lost the confidence of the president at that point, Nixon ordered the creation of a secret White House "plumbers unit," to investigate and intimidate Ellsberg. Among the operations it conducted was a break-in of his psychiatrist's office in Los Angeles. How the plumbers ended up in a purely political operation, like the Watergate break-in remains unknown to this day.

All told, the tapes are fascinating. While I regret, as President Ford would, that they came out now, they are out there. Hopefully more comes of them soon. It would be tragic if Woodward didn't produce the book that he told Ford he was writing and those tapes became another sensationalistic "scoop of the day" for The Washington Post.


Easy Listening Recommendation of the Day: No More Mr. Nice Guy By: Alice Cooper From: Alice Cooper's Greatest Hits

Permalink

Labels: , ,

3:51 PM